Lessons from the Canadian election



The result of the Canadian federal election has not yet been confirmed, but it is clear that the Liberal Party has comfortably won the most seats. The likely outcome is a Liberal minority government (projections put the Liberals on 168, four seats short of a majority) but that represents a remarkable turnaround for an incumbent party that trailed in the polls by 27 points in early January.

Credibility matters. Ultimately Mark Carney was seen as a more credible Prime Minister than Pierre Poilievre. Despite the differences in the respective levels of political experience, in a short time Carney has been able to demonstrate decisive, strong leadership and has an impressive career outside of politics. The Conservatives had wanted to make the election a referendum on Justin Trudeau and his record in government, but were thwarted by Trudeau's resignation and by the defining issue moving from perceived Liberal failures to the relationship with the US. In this area, Carney was able to build credibility in a way his opponents were not. 

Voters want stability more than they want change. In January, the Liberals were polling at around 20%. Electoral annihilation seemed a near certainty. Pierre Poilievre seemed unstoppable. The consensus view was that the Conservatives would benefit massively from disaffected voters. But what we saw in Canada is that, when political leaders focus on the issues voters care about, minds (and voting intentions) can be changed. It also became apparent that the populist tactics previously employed by the Conservatives ceased to work once the incumbent party found a way of reconnecting with the electorate. 

The Conservatives promised "change" - probably the most utilised word in their electoral campaign. Change was necessary, they argued, to rescue Canada from a decade of Liberal misgovernance. Whatever problem they were talking about, it was Justin Trudeau's Liberal government that was responsible. This tactic ceased to be effective when political realities changed and the president of a neighbouring country threatened his own kind of change - change that would provide destabilising and potentially destructive. 

Conservative calls for change increasingly sounded like echoes of Trumpism. While few voters will be attracted by appeals to maintain the status quo, they value stability far more than they want change for the sake of it. The kind of change being promoted centred on the assumption that the Liberals were unfit to govern, something that became less convincing as Mark Carney's style of leadership won over disaffected voters. Much of the promised "change", such as dropping climate change commitments, was too extreme for many. 

The "pragmatic" Carney understood this and was able to advocate a form of change that appealed to voters concerned by the potential impact of Trump's anti-Canadian actions. The change Poilievre offered was often far from reassuring and too focused on criticisms of his opponents to be effective. By way of comparison, Carney's advocacy of a change of relationship with the US, lowering income tax for the lowest earners and improving housing affordability are key examples of "change" being focused on real problems rather than political ideology. 

Presidentialised elections = squeeze. The FPTP electoral system squeezes smaller parties when elections become polarised around binary questions. Bloc Quebecois, the Greens and the New Democratic Party all lost seats, with the latter losing its official party status and its leader finishing in third place in his riding. Support collapsed not because of these parties' perceived failings but because the political discussion became constricted around a particular issue (i.e.the relationship with the US) and was presented - and perceived - in presidential terms as a Carney v Poilievre race. 

Support for smaller parties inevitably collapses when they are being marginalised by prevailing media narratives presenting arguments in binary terms, which results in a struggle for relevance and renders appeals to tactical voting immaterial.

Go anti-woke, go broke. Echoing the rhetoric of a US president widely perceived as Canada's enemy was not a wise thing to do, and being seen as cosying up to Donald Trump had consequences. (Keir Starmer, take note.) While stopping short of Trump's more radical positions on e.g. immigration, Pierre Poilievre sought to emulate the US president in many respects, railing against “radical woke ideology”, embracing culture wars, championing the fossil fuel industry, eliminating commitments to addressing climate change, pledging to cut foreign aid and adopting the slogan "Canada First". He lost not only the election but also his own seat - to a Liberal advocating the green economy and climate action. 

Trump is a great recruiting sergeant for Liberalism. The Liberals looked dead and buried until Trump threatened tariffs and talked about Canada becoming the 51st state. The US president's intervention as late as Monday, calling on Canadians to "elect the man" who would make Canada the 51st US state, only helped Mark Carney. For many Canadians, a vote for the Conservatives was also a vote for Donald Trump. 

If Poilievre had made more of an effort to distance himself from the US president, rather than cast himself in the role of "little Trump", the Conservatives may well have fared better. The party leader made it very easy for comparisons with Trump to be made.

Trump's unpopularity can, and will, be used against those who ally themselves to him. (Reform, take note.)

Aggressive tactics don't always work. Three months ago it seemed inconceivable that the Conservatives could lose this election and, while Mark Carney deserves credit for the way he has rejuvenated the Liberals, the Conservative defeat was largely self-inflicted. There was no need to act in ways that appeared Trump-lite, to aggressively pursue culture wars or advance the kind of combative rhetoric that appealed to few beyond the party's base. The outcome may have been different if the Conservatives had managed to find a way of appealing to the nation rather than cynically trying to exploit cultural issues. (Kemi Badenoch, take note.)

Electorates don't always punish incumbent parties. Earlier this year, the Canadian Conservatives would have expected to cruise to victory against an unpopular incumbent government. What could possibly go wrong? Harold Macmillan's warning about taking popularity for granted  - "events, dear boy, events!" -  may have been aimed at governments but applies equally to oppositions. Apparently secure paths to victory can disappear if opportunities aren't seized. Despite the signs, the Conservatives clearly didn't anticipate what Mark Carney has termed "the American betrayal" until it was too late, and then allowed Mark Carney to project himself as the guardian of Canada's sovereignty. 

Justin Trudeau's resignation marked the beginning of the Liberal resurgence, but there was no inevitability about it. The Conservatives' lack of a convincing response to Trump's threats was a political gift for the Liberals, while their doubling down on the "Canada First" and "Elbows up" narrative proved counter-productive. The one popular policy they had - "axe the tax" - was rendered irrelevant when Carney announced an end to the carbon tax. 

Incumbents can win in seemingly impossible situations if they can demonstrate they're in tune with the public and find ways of regaining trust. Opportunities for success increase if opponents adopt counterintuitive tactics. 

As for the wider political significance of the result, especially in a global context, I will leave it for others to comment. For now I extend my congratulations to the Liberal Party of Canada and offer my best wishes to the Canadian people. 

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